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(percent per  year)
Stocks 9.54 11.23
Corporate bonds 5.39 5.46
Government bonds 4.85 5.04
Treasury bills 3.64 4.72
B. Real returns
1927–95 1946–95
(percent per  year)
Stocks 6.43 7.03
Corporate bonds 2.28 1.25
Government bonds 1.74 0.84
Treasury bills 0.52 0.52
Notes: Stock data are returns to a value-weighted
portfolio of stocks traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). Corporate bond data are returns
to the Salomon Brothers’ Long-Term High-Grade
Corporate Bond Index. The government bond and
Treasury bill data are the returns to a 20-year bond
and the returns to the shortest term bill with not
less than one month to maturity, respectively. Real
data are adjusted for inflation as measured by the
Consumer Price Index.
Source: University of Chicago, Center for Research
on Security Prices (CRSP).






Notes: Returns are returns to a value-weighted
portfolio of stocks traded on the NYSE.
Source: CRSP.
2. Average stock returns Whither the stock market?
The United States stock market has
long provided the highest average re-
turn among all financial assets. Accord-
ing to figure 1, stocks earned signif-
cantly  higher average returns over the
last 68 years than other financial assets
such as corporate bonds or Treasury
bills. While the stock returns shown
in figure 1 are impressive, investors
are more concerned with inflation-
adjusted returns. Panel B of figure 1
presents average real returns after
adjusting for inflation. The stock mar-
ket’s performance has been even
more remarkable in recent years. Fig-
ure 2 presents data on average real
returns over the past 12, 24, and 36
months. The market’s superior per-
formance has led investment advisors
to recommend stocks for retirement
saving and has prompted calls for
privatizing Social Security so that indi-
viduals can exploit these exceptional
returns. In a December 1996 Wall
Street Journal article, one-time presiden-
tial hopeful Steve Forbes compared
the “historic 9% to 10% annual returns
from stock market investments” to the
“lifetime return of only about 2.2%”
a worker receives from the current
social security system.1 His argument
for privatization seems especially com-
pelling given the stock market’s recent
performance.
There is, however, a down side to the
recent run-up in stock prices: the cur-
rently high stock market valuation may
actually forecast low future returns.
There are many ways to determine
whether stock prices are “high.” For
example, the ratio of stock prices to
either earnings, book value, or cash
flows provides a measure of the relative
level of stock prices. In this Fed Letter,
we use the dividend yield, defined as
the ratio of dividends to stock prices.
When the dividend yield is low, stock
prices are considered relatively high
and vice versa. As figure 3 indicates,
the average dividend yield from 1927
to 1995 was about 4.4%. Figure 4 dis-
plays the level of dividend yields over
time and shows that the average divi-
dend yield in 1997 was at a historic low
of 2.0%. According to the figure, the
current high level of U.S. stock prices
(as measured by dividend yields) is
without precedent.
A look back at stock returns
In the past, very high stock prices have
not been good news for future stock
returns. In a recent Economic Perspectives
article, John Cochrane shows that over
long horizons (five years), low dividend
yields tend to be associated with low
future stock returns.2 Over time, the
dividend yield tends to move toward
its mean. When stock prices are rela-
tively high, the dividend yield can be
restored to its mean by either having
future stock prices fall or having divi-
dends rise to restore the ratio’s mean.
Historically, the former has been the
case: future stock prices, not dividends,
adjust to move the dividend yield back
to its long-run average. Therefore, in
times of high stock prices, future re-
turns generally fall. It is important to
note, however, that these adjustments
occur over long periods of time. While
stock returns may be expected to fall,
the decline usually occurs gradually.
Therefore, a low dividend yield does
not necessarily forecast a crash or low-
er returns in the immediate future;
rather, it forecasts lower returns over
the next several years.
How much lower will future stock re-
turns be? While we can’t say for sure,
we can get some insight into this ques-
tion by using a very simple model of
stock prices proposed by Gordon and
Shapiro.3 Their model relates the div-
idend yield to stock returns and per-
share dividend growth rates. Gordon
and Shapiro make two simplifying
assumptions.4 First, they assume that
expected returns to stocks are steady.
Second, they assume that dividends
per share are expected to grow at a
steady rate. Under these assumptions,
the future dividend yield is simply3. Yields, returns, and growth, 1927–95
1927–95 1927–45 1946–95 1927–71 1972–95
(-----------------------------------percent per year-----------------------------------)
Dividend yield 4.37 4.95 4.14 4.51 4.14
Real returns 6.43 4.86 7.03 6.73 6.40
Real dividend growth 1.12 –1.62 2.15 0.71 2.34
Average model error 0.009 0.0142 0.007 0.0147 0.004
(.4752) (.2836) (.3943) (.5741) (.1499)
Notes: The dividend yield is per-share dividends paid during a month divided by per-share stock price
as of the previous month-end for stocks traded on the NYSE. Dividend growth is the average annual
growth in monthly dividends per share. Average model error  equals real returns – real dividend growth
– dividend yield. In the last row, robust t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Source: CRSP.
the difference between the expected
stock return and the expected divi-
dend growth rate per share:
Dividend Yield = Expected Stock Return -
Expected Dividend Growth Rate Per Share.
Because our focus is on the long run,
the simplifying assumptions aren’t un-
reasonable. This model may still aid in
understanding the implications of the
currently low dividend yields.
According to figure 3, the simple Gor-
don-Shapiro model fits the historical
data quite well. Figure 3 presents mean
dividend yields, stock returns, and divi-
dend growth rates from January 1927
to December 1995 as well as for the pre-
and post-war periods. The last row in
figure 3, “average model error,” shows
the difference between the Gordon-
Shapiro model and the actual data.
During every period but two, which
include Great Depression data, this dif-
ference is less than 1%. Furthermore,
statistical tests indicate that the differ-
ence is approximately zero.5 There-
fore, over the periods we study, mean
dividend yields are not substantially
different from stock returns less divi-
dend growth rates.
What does the future hold?
What does the past tell us about future
stock returns? Suppose the dividend
to price ratio remains permanently low-
er. According to Gordon and Shapiro’s
model, stock returns will permanently
decrease or dividend growth rates will
permanently increase. Let’s assume
stocks will continue to provide real
annual returns of 11.9%, the average
return over the past three years. If the
dividend to price ratio stabilizes at
2.0%, the model would require that
dividends per share grow at an infla-
tion-adjusted rate of 9.9%. This level
of dividend growth would be truly re-
markable. The average real dividend
growth has been only 1.4% over the
past 10 years. According to figure 3,
for the entire period we studied, real
dividend growth has averaged only
1.1%. In other words, per-share divi-
dend growth rates would have to be
900% higher than their historical aver-
age if stock returns remain permanent-
ly high and dividend yields remain
permanently low. Suppose instead that
stocks will provide returns that are
equal to their post-war historical aver-
age of 7.0%. A 2.0% dividend yield
would then require real dividend
growth of 5.0%, which is more than
three times the average growth rate
over the past 10 years. In fact, from
1927 to the present, there have never
been ten consecutive years when divi-
dends per share grew at an average
rate exceeding 4.85%. If we exclude
1955 (when dividends grew at an ex-
traordinary rate of 16.3%), there is no
ten-year period when dividend growth
exceeded 4.0%. We conclude that to
achieve historical stock returns in the
future, we would need implausibly
high dividend growth rates.
Because we consider these high divi-
dend growth rates to be unrealistic,
let’s look at stock returns given more
realistic dividend growth rates. If divi-
dends per share grow at an inflation
adjusted rate of 2.5% (a high but
plausible figure, given the results in
figure 3) and dividend yields remain
at 2.0%, the Gordon-Shapiro model im-
plies that real stock returns will aver-
age only 4.5% annually, substantially
below the post-war average of 7.0%.
Thus far, we have assumed that divi-
dend yields will remain at their cur-
rent low levels indefinitely. Suppose
instead that the dividend yield adjusts
back to its mean. In this case, either
stock prices will fall or dividends will
increase. On March 14, Warren Buffett,
chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
told stockholders that he believes the
historically high stock prices are justi-
fied as long as interest rates remain
low and corporations continue to pro-
duce “remarkable” returns on equity.6
Buffett apparently believes that future
dividends will rise to justify the low
dividend to price ratio. Unfortunately,
history tells a different story. It is adjust-
ments in stock prices, not dividends,
that historically have driven the divi-
dend yield back toward its mean value.
If dividend yields do revert to their
long-run mean over the next few
years, the long-term prospects for the
stock market over this period are not
favorable.
Our results have important implica-
tions for those saving for retirement.
Many retirement planners base their
investment allocation strategies on the
continued strong performance of the
stock market. If stock returns decline
to a new, permanently lower level of
4.5%, many retirees will have under-
saved for retirement. Similarly, those
who advocate privatizing Social Secu-
rity argue that individuals could more
effectively save for their retirement by
investing their Social  Security contri-
butions in the stock market. This ar-
gument assumes that stocks will
continue to provide investors with the
same outstanding returns that they
have historically provided. Our analy-
sis casts doubt on this assumption.
Therefore, estimates of the benefits of
Social Security privatization, like retire-
ment savings strategies, should consid-
er both pessimistic and optimistic
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1871 ’80 ’89 ’98 ’07 ’16 ’25 ’34 ’43 ’52 ’61 ’70 ’79 ’88 ’97
percent
Note: Dividend yield data are based on the Standard
& Poors Composite Stock Price Index.
Source: Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility, chapter 26. The data were
published on the internet at www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/chap26.html
as of July 8, 1998.
4. Dividend yields, 1871–1997
Conclusion
What might account for the current
low dividend yields and the implied
low expected future returns? At this
point, we can only form tentative con-
jectures. One theory is that members
of the Baby Boom generation had not
adequately saved for retirement in
their early working years. Now that they
are in their prime earning years, they
are making up for lost time. The re-
sulting flood of retirement savings
both drives asset prices up and indi-
cates that savers are willing to accept
a lower return in order to secure
some reasonable parking place for
their money.
The problem with this theory is that it
implies that all expected returns (not
just stock returns) should drop. How-
ever, we find, along with Cochrane,
that the equity premium (the expect-
ed equity return above the Treasury
bill rate) has dropped in recent years.
In other words, expected future stock
returns are lower relative to alternative
assets. The equity premium is proper-
ly understood as a compensation for
risk. Why would today’s investors re-
quire a lower compensation for bear-
ing the considerable risk of the stock
market? Three possibilities emerge.
Perhaps the current generation is
simply less risk
averse. The per-
capita wealth of in-
vestors is higher
than in the past. It
is reasonable to be-
lieve that wealthier
investors are more
willing to bear in-
vestment risk. Per-
haps the stock
market is less risky
now than in the past.
This is a possibility,
but arguments of
this type have been
made before only
to be refuted by the
next crash. Consid-
er, for example, the
following: “For the
last five years we
have been in a new industrial era in
this country. We are making progress
industrially and economically not
even by leaps and bounds, but on a
perfectly heroic scale.” This quota-
tion appeared in Forbes magazine in
June 1929, and the sentiment re-
flects a popular opinion of the cur-
rent American economy as well.
Finally, some investors today may truly
misperceive the amount of risk in the
market. They do not share their par-
ents’ memories of the stagflation of
the 1970s or their grandparents’
memories of the Great Depression
of the 1930s. Only time will tell
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(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
May Month ago Year ago
Cars 5.6 5.5 5.8




May Month ago Year ago
CFMMI 126.4 126.1 121.3
125.7 131.2 131.5 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
June Month ago Year ago
MW 56.8 63.0 55.8
56.0 54.1 50.7 U.S.
1996
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Re-
serve Board’s Industrial Production Index for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and light
trucks are measured in annualized units, using
seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonal-
ly adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing
Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (weighted average of the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production decreased to 56.8%
in June from 63.0% in May. Purchasing managers’ indexes decreased in Chicago
and Detroit, but increased slightly in Milwaukee. The national purchasing man-
agers’ composite index also decreased from 54.1% in May to 50.7% in June.
The CFMMI increased 0.2% in May following a revised increase of 0.6% in
April. The Federal Reserve Board’s IP rose 0.2% in May after increasing 0.5%
in April. Total light motor vehicle production (seasonally adjusted annual rate)
increased from 11.9 million units in April to 12.1 million units in May. In May,
light truck production increased from 6.4 million in April to 6.5 million units
and car production increased from 5.5 million to 5.6 million units.